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independence of central banks significantly increased after 1990, which could preclude the 
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FISCAL AND MONETARY POLICIES
IN A KEYNESIAN STOCK-FLOW CONSISTENT MODEL
Edwin Le Heron
Following the New Classical Macroeconomics (NCM) and the New Keynesian
Macroeconomics (NKM), the independence of central banks significantly increased after 1990,
which could preclude the co-ordination between the fiscal and the monetary policies. The purpose
of this chapter is to consider the stabilizing effects of fiscal policy within the framework of the new
monetary policies implemented by independent central banks. We contrast a rule on public
expenditures with a rule on public deficits. In order to do so, we develop a two-country model. In
the first country, the government implements a fiscal policy with automatic stabilizers and a central
bank has a dual mandate: inflation and growth. There is a co-ordination between fiscal and
monetary policies. The second country implements an orthodox fiscal policy (balanced budget) and
the central bank has a unique objective: inflation.
In the first part of the paper, we build a Post Keynesian stock-flow consistent (SFC) model
(Lavoie and Godley, 2001, 2007, Dos Santos and Zezza, 2004, Mouakil, 2006) with a private banks
sector introducing more realistic features. We introduce the borrower’s and the lender’s risks from
the Minskian approach. New Keynesian Macroeconomics replaces the three equations of the
Keynesian synthesis by three new equations of the new consensus: an IS relation, a Taylor Rule
(TR) (Taylor, 1993) and a New Keynesian Phillips Curve (NKPC) (Taylor, 1979). IS-LM-Phillips
Curve has been changed into IS-TR-NKPC. Our Post Keynesian SFC model (59 equations) replaces
the IS relation. Then, we add two of the three equations of the new consensus in macroeconomics: a
Taylor rule and a NKPC. IS-TR-NKPC is changed in SFC-TR-NKPC.
In the second part, we simulate the model to study the stabilizing effects of fiscal policy. The
aim is to analyze the consequences of a supply shock within our two assumptions on the policy mix.
If the society seeks after three aims: stability of prices, full employment and stability on the
financial markets, we can measure the welfare performance of our policy mix by their welfare cost
deduced from the loss function of the society. We make a comparison for the two countries.
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A POST KEYNESIAN STOCK-FLOW CONSISTENT GROWTH MODEL
WITH A FULL BANKING SECTOR, A TAYLOR RULE AND A NEW
KEYNESIAN PHILLIPS CURVE
Building a stock-flow consistent model requires three steps: writing the matrices, counting the
variables and the accounting identities issued from the matrices, and defining each unknown with
an equation (accounting identity or behavioural equation).
Matrices
Five sectors form our economy: government, firms, households, private banks and central
bank.  All production must be financed. However, current production is financed by the working
capital of entrepreneurs (retained earnings) and by contracted revolving funds granted by banks at
the current rate of interest. These two factors constitute a shock absorber to possible monetary
rationing by banks. We are essentially limiting our study to the effects that monetary policy might
have on new financing for investment and growth of production.
Let us proceed to examine the gross supply (ϕ) and the net supply (ΔF) of finance by banks –
that is to say, the new flow of money, as opposed to the existing stock of money (D). Also, there is
a stock of money demand equal to transaction, precaution, finance and speculative motives, whereas
the desired gross finance demand (ϕd) represents the new flow of financing required by firms (Id)
plus the redemption of the debt (amortization = amort) minus the undistributed profits (Pu). Thus
the internal funds of firms (IF) represent the undistributed profits (Pu) minus the redemption of the
debt (amort). Assuming a closed economy, demand for money can be satisfied by banks, either by
the stock markets or by credit. At the end of the period, net financing demand (ΔFD) can be
constrained by net money supply from banks (ΔF) (granted financing - paid off financing -
amortization). ΔF determines monetary creation in the period.
We discuss here a closed economy. Firms issue equities, bonds with fixed rates of interest and
commercial papers, and borrow money from banks to finance investments but they neither hold
money balance. They have excess capacity but no inventories.1 Two factors are involved in
producing goods (fixed capital and labour), but we deal with a vertically integrated sector and hence
ignore all intermediate goods. Banks have no operating costs and they don’t make loans to
households. Contrary to Lavoie-Godley (2001), private banks own a net wealth and retain all their
profits.
The central bank has neither operating costs nor net worth. The central bank pays all its
profits to the government, which collects taxes from households and finances its deficit by issuing
Treasury bills. Government expenditures are only final sales of consumption goods: there is neither
operating costs (like wages for state employees) nor transfers between households. The financial
behaviour of households is simplified: they hold only banking deposit account (current accounts
and time deposits).
                                                
1 Excess capacity exists because of expectations of future demand, entry barriers, cost minimization, time-taking
production. For the role of inventories see Godley and Lavoie (2007: chapter 9).
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SFC modelling is based on two tables: a balance sheet matrix (stocks) and a transactions
matrix (flows). Table 8.1 gives the transactions matrix that describes monetary flows between the
five sectors of the economy. Every row represents a monetary transaction, and every column
corresponds to a sector, which is fragmented in a current and a capital account, except in basic cases
such as the government and that of households. Sources of funds appear with plus signs and uses of
funds with negative signs, so every row must sum to zero seeing that each transaction corresponds
always simultaneously to a source and a use of funds. The sum of each column must also be zero
since each account (or sub-account) is balanced.
 4
Firms Private banks Central Bank (CB)Sector
Operation
Govt
Current Capital
Households
Current Capital Current Capital
Σ
Consumption  + C  - C     0
Government
expenditures - G + G  0
Net investment  + I - I     0
Wages - W  + W   0
Taxes + T - T  0
Interest on
Treasury Bills - ib -1.B-1 + ib –1. B -1  0
Interest on loans  - il –1 .L –1  + il –1 .L –1   0
Interest on
comm. paper - icp –1 ⋅ CP-1 +icp –1 ⋅ CP-1  0
Interest on
bonds - iof ⋅ of-1 + iof ⋅ of-1  0
Interest on bank
deposits + id -1.D-1 - id-1.D-1  0
Interest on CB
advances - icb –1 .REF-1 +icb –1 .REF-1  0
Profits of firms - P + Pu + Pd  0
Profits of banks - Pb + Pb  0
Profits of CB + Pcb  - Pcb  0
Δ HPM - ΔH + ΔH  0
Δ T Bills + ΔB - ΔB  0
Δ equities + Δe . pe - Δe . pe  0
Δ loans  + ΔL  - ΔL  0
Δ commercial
paper
+ Δ CP - Δ CP  0
Δ bonds + Δof ⋅ pof - Δof ⋅ pof  0
Δ bank deposits - ΔD + ΔD  0
Δ CB advances + ΔREF - ΔREF  0
Σ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0   0 
Table 8.1: Transactions matrix
Table 8.2 gives the balance sheet matrix of our economy. Symbols with plus describe assets
and negative signs indicate liabilities. The sum of every row is again zero except in the case of
accumulated capital in the industrial sector. The last row presents the net wealth of each sector.
 5
Table 8.2: Balance sheet matrix
Variables and accounting identities
Building a model that describes the monetary economy of production discussed above in a
consistent way requires that the transactions matrix should be properly translated into equations.
First, the model must contain the 26 variables of the matrix. Each of these 26 variables can be
associated with the behaviour of one of the five sectors of our economy.
Government: G, T, B, ib
Firms: I, W, P, Pu, Pd, e
Households: C, D
Private banks: il, L, icp, CP, iof, pof, of, pe, id, Pb
Central Bank: H, icb, REF, Pcb
Second, we must use the accounting identities resulting from each row and each column sum
to zero. We have nine accounting identities corresponding to the eight columns of the transactions
matrix and to the non-ordinary row2. To start we transcribe the identities (uses of funds on the left
side, sources of funds on the right side) without being precise how we will use them in the model:
 (i) G + (ib-1 · B-1) ≡ T + Pcb + ΔB
(ii) W + (il-1 · L-1) + (icp-1 · CP-1) + (iof  · of-1) + P ≡ C + I + G
(iii) I ≡ Pu + (Δe · pe) + ΔL + ΔCP + (Δof · pof) ≡ ϕ + P
u – amort
(iv) C + T + ΔD ≡ W + (id-1 · D-1)
(v) (id-1 · D-1) + (icb-1 · REF-1) + Pb ≡ (ib-1 · B-1) + (il-1 · L-1) + (icp-1 · CP-1) + (iof · of-1) + P
d
(vi) ΔH + ΔB + (Δe · pe) + ΔL + ΔCP + (Δof · pof)  ≡ Pb + ΔD + ΔREF
                                                
2 What we call non-ordinary row is the row concerning profits of banks that includes three different variables (see ix).
             Sector
    Assets Government Firms Households Private banks Central Bank
Σ
Capital + K  + K
HPM
high powered
money
+ H - H  0
Treasury Bills - B + B  0
Equities - e · pe  + e · pe  0
Loans - L + L  0
Commercial
paper
- CP + CP  0
Bonds
(fixed-yield)
- of ⋅ pof + of ⋅ pof  0
Bank deposits  + D - D  0
CB advances - REF + REF  0
Net wealth - B + Vf  + D + Vb 0 + K
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(vii) Pcb ≡ icb-1 · REF-1
(viii) ΔREF ≡ ΔH
(ix) P ≡ Pu + Pd
A feature of SFC models is that if there are M columns and N non ordinary rows in the
transactions matrix, then there are only (M + N – 1) independent accounting identities in the model.
Because of this one equation must be dropped: we shall use exactly eight accounting identities in
the model. Concerning the balance sheet matrix, it is simpler: we just make sure that initial values
of stocks are consistent with the matrix. In the following periods, stocks will stay consistent since
our eight identities will generate consistent flows. Now we must define every variable relative to the
five sectors using an accounting identity3 or a behavioural equation. When we introduce new
unknowns in a behavioural equation we define them immediately so that our model should have the
same number of equations as unknowns.
The national income (Y) adds the household consumption (C), investment of the firms (I)
and the public expenditure (G). The rate of growth of the national income is gry:
(8.1) Y = C + I + G
(8.2) gry = ΔY /Y -1
Two fiscal policies for the Government: G, T, B, ib
The government collects only taxes from households (on wages):
(8.3) T = τ · W-1 With τ: constant
The government finances any deficit issuing bills, so that the supply of treasury bills (B) in
the economy is identical to the stock of government debt. In other words, it is given by the pre-
existing stock of debt plus its current deficit (GD). The current deficit of the Government includes
the redemption of the National debt. We assume that private banks give limitless credit to
government at the long-term rate of interest:
(8.4) B = B-1 + GD
(8.5) ib = il
To analyze the consequences of a supply shock, we assume two different assumptions for the
fiscal policy. We contrast a rule on public expenditures (F1) with a rule on public deficits (F2).
Assumption 1 (F1): A stabilizing effect of the fiscal policy
First, we assume that public expenditure (G) is always growing at the same rate (gry) as the
national income (Y). With F1, public expenditure is pro-cyclical, because G falls with the GDP. But
the final effect of the fiscal policy is measured by the government deficit (GD). Tax revenue is
proportional to income and hence varies in line with the public expenditure. But with a
contractionary monetary policy and its higher interest rate, the financial costs of the national debt
increase. The global impact is linked to the key interest rate and, then, to the monetary policy. It
looks like a co-ordination between the monetary and the fiscal policies. With F1, the economy has a
                                                
3 When we use an accounting identity we often need to rewrite it so we will always recall its number (using Roman
numeral), rendering it more easily recognizable by the reader.
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self-stabilizing tendency due to the fiscal policy, though the fiscal policy effect comes through the
effects of interest rate on the budget deficit.
(8.6-F1)  G = G-1· (1 + gry -1)
(8.7-i-F1) GD = G + (ib-1 · B-1) – T – Pcb
Assumption 2 (F2): a ‘neutral’ fiscal policy
Second, we assume that a ‘neutral’ fiscal policy corresponds to a constant ratio (rGD) of
government deficit-to-the last national income:  DB/Y-1. It is more or less the case of the Maastricht
treaty of the European Union. The stability and growth pact of the Treaty decrees that ‘Member
States shall avoid excessive government deficits’. Then we use the first accounting identity to
calculate the adequate public expenditure. In experiences, we shall take the ratio (rGD) equal to zero
as is required by the Maastricht treaty. Contrary to the previous assumption, the public debt is zero,
since the budget is balanced. As the interest rate does not act on fiscal policy, there is no co-
ordination between the fiscal and the monetary policies.
(8.6-F2) GD = rGD · Y-1 With rGD: constant
(8.7-i-F2) G ≡ GD - (ib-1 · B-1) + T + Pcb
With these assumptions, we should better understand the links between monetary policy and
fiscal policy (Figure 8.1)4:
0,94
0,95
0,96
0,97
0,98
0,99
1
1,01
1 6 11 16 21 26 31 36
Growth rate of GDP with F1 and key interest rate +1% Growth rate of GDP with F2 and key interest rate +1%
Figure 8.1 Higher key interest rate (from 2 to 3% after 2005):
effects on the growth rate of the economy with F1 and F2
                                                
4 In all the figures (except the figure 8.4), all values on the vertical axis are homogenized to one for the steady state.
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Firms: I, W, P, Pu, Pd, e, OG
The investment function is the most important one in a growth model. The stock of capital
increases with the flow of net investment (I) that is financed by the total of external funds from
commercial banks (gross finance = ϕ) and by the internal funds of firms. The self-financing of firms
corresponds to the retained earnings (Pu) minus the redemption of the debts of firms (amort).
Amortization concerns only the debt: loans (L), bonds (OF) and commercial papers (CP).
(8.8) K = K-1 + I
(8.9-iii)I ≡ ϕ + IF
(8.10) IF = Pu – amort
(8.11) amort = (al ⋅ L-1) + (aof ⋅ of-1) + (acp ⋅ CP-1)
In our model, we focus on the difference between actual investment (I) and the desired
investment of firms (ID). The banks accept to finance totally or in part the second one according
their lender’s risk (LR) (see equations 8.32, 8.33, 8.35). A monetary rationing on investment can
exist (ϕ<ϕd or I<ID). The desired rate of accumulation (grkD) is function of an exogenous state of
confidence (γ0), the capacity utilization rate (u) and of the borrower’s risk (BR), which is measured
by the rate of cash flow (rcf) and by the financial condition index (FCI). The rate of cash flow is the
ratio of retained earnings to capital and the financial condition index captures the sensitivity of
investment to the long-term interest rate, to the short-term interest rate and to the financial
capitalization ratio. The lender’s risk and the borrower’s risk come from the analysis of H. Minsky.
(8.12) ID = grkD · K-1
(8.13) ϕd = Id – IF
(8.14) grkD = γ0 + (γ1 · rcf-1) + (γ2 · u-1) – (γ3 ⋅ FCI –1)     With γi: constant
where the rate of capacity utilization is defined as the ratio of output to full capacity output (Yfc.):
(8.15) rcf = P
u /K-1
(8.16) u = Y /Yfc
The capital-to-full capacity ratio (σ) is defined as a constant:
(8.17) Yfc = K-1 ⋅ σ With σ: constant
(8.18) FCI = (µ1 ⋅ il ⋅ L/K) + (µ2 ⋅ icb ⋅ CP/K) – (µ3 ⋅ E/Y) With µi: constants
Concerning wages, they can be decomposed into a unit wage (w) times the level of
employment (N):
(8.19a)W = w · N
where employment is determined by sales given productivity (σ2):
(8.19b)N = Y / σ2 With σ2: constant
The full employment (Nfe) is:
(8.19c)Nfe = Yfc / σ2 With σ2: constant
The unemployment (Un) or the output gap (OG) are easily found:
(8.19d)Un = Nfe – N
(8.19e)OG = Y – Yfc
The rate of unemployment run is:
(8.19f) run = Un / Nfc
For the model, we measure the output gap in ratio:
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(8.19) OGR = (Y – Yfc)/ Yfc
We assume that the ratio ‘wages on output’ (W/Y) is exogenous and constant.
(8.20) W = Y / ρ With ρ: constants
Total profits (P) of firms are the difference between their sales and their expenditures (wages
and interest payments on loans, commercial papers and bonds):
(8.21-ii) P ≡ Y– W – (il-1 · L-1) – (icp-1 · CP-1) – (iof · of-1)
Distributed dividends (Pd) are a fraction of profits realized in the previous period:
(8.22) Pd = (1 - sf) · P-1    With sf: constant
Retained earnings (Pu) are determined as the residual:
(8.23-ix) Pu ≡  P – Pd
Equations concerning issues of equities by firms are usually oversimplified in SFC models. We
simply assume that the stock of shares grows at the rate of the GDP with a lag of one year  (gry-1):
Δe / e-1 = gry-1. The more the economy grows, the more firms issue equities. There are two
explanations. First it is easier to sell new equities when the economy and thus the profits grow.
Second, firms need new finance to follow the growth of the GDP.
(8.24) e = e-1 · (1+gry-1)
Households: C, D
We assume that households determine their consumption expenditure (C) on the basis of their
expected disposable income and their wealth of the previous period (that consist entirely of bank
deposits: current accounts and time deposits):
(8.25) C = (α1 ·Yw
a) + (α2 · Yv
a) + (α3 ·D-1) With αi: constant  1>α1>α2>α3>0
(8.26) Yw
a = Yw-1 + θh · (Yw-1 – Yw
a
-1) With θh: constant
(8.27) Yv
a = Yv-1 + θh · (Yv-1 – Yv
a
-1)
(8.28) Yw = W– T
(8.29) Yv = id-1 ⋅ D-1
(8.30) Yh = Yw + Yv
Whereas (Yw
a) is the expected disposable income of workers, (Yv
a) the expected disposable
financial income and each (αi) is a propensity to consume. There are adaptive expectations
5.
Following the Kaleckian tradition, we assume that wages are mostly consumed while
financial income is largely devoted to saving (1>α1>α2>0). This class-based saving behaviour is of
importance in a SFC model where interest payments play a great role. With the same high
propensity to consume (α1=α2), an increase of the interest rates can move the economy to a higher
growth path in the long run. The consumption decision determines the amount that households will
save out of their disposable income Yh:
(8.31-iv) D ≡ D-1 + Yh – C
                                                
5 The expected value of any variable for current period (represented with the superscript a) depends on its value of the
previous period plus an error correction mechanism where (θ) represents the speed of adjustment in expectations.
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Private banks: il,  L,  icp,  CP,  iof,  pof,  of,  id,  pe,  Pb
Firms’ financing is fundamental in a monetary economy of production. Firms begin by being
self-financed then turn to external finance (ΔFD). Banks only finance projects they consider
profitable, but confidence in their judgment is variable and can justify various strategies. Banks
examine firms’ productive and financial expectations and also their financial structure. This
investigation is made according to their confidence in the state of long-term expectations of yields
on capital assets, influencing what Keynes referred to as ‘animal spirits’. After the study of
expected production and of demand of financing that integrates the firm’s borrowing risk (rb),
bankers can refuse to finance. The state of confidence of banks summarizes these factors.
Banks know a lender’s risk (LR) when underwriting finance6 and creating money. Lender’s risk
is the sum of three fundamental risks:
• First, risk of default corresponds to the bank’s perception regarding the borrower’s
likelihood failure to repay the claim.
• Second, risk of liquidity. Liquidity entails the ability to reverse a decision at any
moment at the smallest possible cost.
• Third, market risk corresponds to unanticipated changes on the various financial
markets. Market risk can be split into other risks. Fluctuations in capital asset prices modify
their value and explain capital risk - which is very high for equities and fixed-yield bonds.
For the fixed-yield bonds, capital risk is inversely proportional to interest rates. The risk of
income mainly concerns the highly uncertain dividends of equities and the variable yield of
loans. Finaly, monetary policy involves a money market risk when fluctuations in the money
interest rates occur.
In equations (8.32, 8.35, 8.52, 8.53), the risks of default and of liquidity are take account by the
gap of the leverage ratio with a conventional leverage ratio. We also introduce the Tobin’s q ratio
and the cost of indebtedness for the risk of default. The market risk is taken into account by the
expected capital gains on equities (CGe
a) and on fixed-yield bonds (CGof
a), but also with the central
bank interest rate.
When the lender’s risk is at a maximum (LR = 1), commercial banks refuse to finance the net
investment of firms: ΔF = 0. Desired investment (ID) faces a serious finance rationing. The flow of
net investment is only financed by self-funding, that is the retained earnings (Pu), minus the
amortization of the debt, minus the capital losses of firms (CG). Thus the money supply (in stock)
can be reduced with the redemption of the debt. If the lender’s risk is null (LR = 0), desired
investment is fully financed: ΔF = ΔFD or ϕ = ϕ
d. It is the horizontalist case. The capital losses of
firms are also the capital gains of banks, measured by the capital losses on equities (CGe) and on
fixed rate bonds (CGof) (équations 44 and 50).
(8.32) ϕ = ϕd .(1 – LR) With  0 ≤ LR ≤ 1
(8.33) ΔF = ϕ - amort + CG
(8.34) CG = CGe  + CGof
                                                
6 We will take into account the loans (L) (long-term), the short-term securities as treasury bills (B) and commercial
papers (CP), bonds (fixed-rate (OF)) and equities (E).
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In the model, the lender’s risk (LR) is measured by the difference between the current leverage
ratio and the conventional leverage ratio (quantity of indebtedness), by the Tobin’s q ratio and by
the cost of indebtedness (icb). The higher current indebtedness of firms ((CP + OF + L)/K) is over
the accepted indebtedness, the more the lender’s risk is. The accepted indebtedness is conventional,
but this conventional indebtedness can increase during a boom and decrease during a crisis. Tobin’s
q ratio is measured by the financial value of the firms on the capital (K). The financial value is the
value of the equities on the market.
(8.35) LR = a1 ⋅ (lev-1 - levc) – (b1 ⋅ q-1) + (c1 ⋅ icb) With a1, b1, c1 et levc: constant
(8.36) lev = (CP + OF + L) / K
(8.37) q = (e ⋅ pe) / K 
We come to the equations defining the portfolio behaviour of banks. We follow the
methodology developed by Godley and Lavoie (2007) and inspired by Tobin (1958). Banks can
hold four different assets: bonds (with fixed rate of interest) OF = of . pof, equities E = e . pe, loans
at variable long-term interest rate (L) and commercial paper (CP) at short-term interest rate. The λij
parameters follow the vertical, horizontal and symmetry constraints (Godley and Lavoie, 2007).
Banks are assumed to make a certain proportion λi0 of their financing in the form of asset i but this
proportion is modified by the rates of return on these assets. Banks are concerned about (il) and
(icp), the rates of interest on loans and on commercial paper to be determined at the end of the
current period, but which will generate the interest payments in the following period. We have
further assumed that it is the expected rates of return on equities (re
a) and on bonds (rof
a) that enter
into the determination of portfolio choice. The four assets demand function described with the
matrix algebra are thus:
(8.38) OF = (λ10 + λ11· rof
a - λ12 · re
a - λ13 · il- λ14 · icp) · F
(8.39) E   = (λ20 - λ21· rof
a + λ22 · re
a - λ23 · il - λ24 · icp) · F
(8.40) L   = (λ30 - λ31· rof
a - λ32 · re
a + λ33 · il - λ34 · icp) · F
(8.41a)CP = (λ40 - λ41· rof
a - λ42 · re
a - λ43 · il - λ44 · icp) · F
As it is the case with every matrix, we cannot keep all these equations in the model because
each one of them is a logical implication of the others. We model commercial paper as the residual
equation:
(8.41) CP = F – OF – E – L
For the bonds, the expected rate of yield (rof
a) is the fixed interest rate plus the expected
capital gains on the market value of the previous period of these bonds (OF-1). The market value of
the bonds is the number of bonds (of) times their prices (pof). The interest rate (iof) is always the
long-term interest rate of the first period applied to the initial price (in t0, pof = 1). But after the first
period, the prices of the old and of the new fixed-yield bonds (pof) is inversely proportional to the
changes in the long-term interest rates (il).
The expected value of capital gains on bonds (CGof
a) and on equities (CGe
a) for current period
depends on its value of the previous period plus an error correction mechanism where (θ) represents
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the speed of adjustment in expectations. The capital gains (CGof and CGe) correspond to the
variations in the price times the quantity of the previous period.
(8.42) rof
a = iof + CGof
a/OF-1 With iof : constant
(8.43) CGof
a = CGof-1 + θb . (CGof-1 – CGof
a
-1)
(8.44) CGof = Δpof · of-1
(8.45) of = OF/pof
(8.46) pof = pof-1 · (1+ iof)/(1 + il)
For the equities, the expected rate of yield (re
a) is the sum of the expected distributed profits
(Pda) and the expected capital gains (CGe
a), on the market value of the previous period of these
equities (E-1). As usual, the expected distributed profits (P
da) for current period depends on its value
of the previous period plus an error correction mechanism where (θ) represents the speed of
adjustment in expectations. The only price clearing mechanism of this model occurs in the equity
market. The price of equities (pe) will allow the equilibrium between the number of equities (e; see
equation 8.22) that has been issued by firms (the supply) and the amount of equities (E) that private
banks want to hold (the demand).
(8.47) re
a = (Pd a + CGe
a) / E-1
(8.48) Pd a = Pd-1 + θb . (P
d
-1 - P
d a
-1)
(8.49) CGe
a = CGe-1 + θb . (CGe-1 – CGe
a
-1)
(8.50) CGe = Δpe · e-1
(8.51)     pe = E / e
Monetary authorities determine exogenously the key rate on the money market (icb). In 1936,
Keynes asserts that this rate is widely conventional. While central banks fix the short-term rates,
private banks’ liquidity preference determines banking rates (short, medium and long-term interest
rates). Significant rates for growth and financing (loan) are the long-term interest rates (il). The link
between short-term and long-term interest rates is complex. Macroeconomic banking interest rates
(il) are the production costs of money plus a risk premium. The first element corresponds to
functioning costs (wages, investment, immobilization); payment costs for monetary liabilities
(subjected to the firms competition for households savings) and the cost of high powered money
determined by the central bank; and to a rate of margin (χ) corresponding to standard profits of
banks. The production costs of money are equal to (icb) plus a relatively constant mark up (χ).
Risk premiums are not constant because they are the fruits of the banks’ liquidity preference.
Risk premiums cover lender’s risk (lr). Five expectations strongly influence risk premiums:
anticipations about the productivity, economic evolution (growth, employment) and budget;
expected inflation; the level of future short-term rates of interest; financial markets’ evolution and
capital assets’ prices; foreign long-term rates present. In the model, we use the same lender’s risk as
the one seen previously (equation 8.35), that is a mix of leverage ratio and Tobin’s q ratio. But with
the different coefficients (a2) and (b2), (lr) can be negative and reduces the mark up. Therefore the
long-term interest rate becomes endogenous and the spread between (icb) and (il) is not constant.
Contrary to the horizontalist’ view, we introduce an endogenous curve of the interest rates. To
explain the short-term interest rates (ib or icp), icb and χ are sufficient. On the contrary, lr is the
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primary variable in order to explain long-term interest rates (il, iof,). Banks apply a spread (χ3)
between the key rate and the rate on deposits in order to realize profits. 
(8.52) il = icb + lr + χ1     With χ1: constant  χ1 > χ2
(8.53) lr = a2 ⋅ (lev-1 - levc) - b2 ⋅ q-1
With a2, b2, levc constant and c = convention on the ‘normal’ debt ratio
(8.54) icp = icb + χ2 With χ2: constant  χ1 > χ2
(8.55) id = icb - χ3
The initial structure of interest rates is as following: il > iof > icp > ib = icb  > id
Banks try to maximize their net income. To make a profit, they finance the economy and
agree to become less liquid. By making the almost irreversible decisions of financing, they are
subjected to the lender’s risk. They can hope for big profits only by lowering their LPB. Economic
activity also depends on the animal spirits of banks. Finance scarcity can only be the consequence
of a deliberate choice. ‘Desired scarcity’ of financing is the sign of banks’ liquidity preference.
From an optimal structure of their balance sheet, we can measure the profits of commercial banks
(Pb) obtained by monetary financing:
(8.56-v) Pb  ≡  ib-1 . B-1 + il-1 . L-1 + icp-1 . CP-1 + iof . of-1 + P
d – id-1 . D-1 – icb-1 . REF-1
Central Bank : H,  icb,  REF,  ib,  Pcb, , Π, LF
It is assumed that banks are obliged by the government to hold reserve requirements (H) in high
powered money that do not generate interest payments and that must always be a fixed share (the
compulsory ratio η) of deposits:
(8.57) H = η · D
Since the central bank is collecting interest payments advances while paying out no interest on
the notes, it is also making profits Pcb:
(8.58-vii) Pcb ≡  icb-1 . REF-1
It is assumed, in line with current practice, that any profits realized by the central bank revert to
the government. Following the theory of endogenous money, we assume that the central bank is
fully accommodating. First the central bank fixes the key rate of interest (icb) using a Taylor rule
and second it provides whatever advances (REF) demanded by banks at this rate.
Taylor propounded his first rule in 1993, modelling the dual mandate of the Fed. It was founded
on the output gap and on the inflation gap. But the output gap generates a theoretical problem to the
RBC models (Goodfriend-King or Rotenberg-Woodford) and creates an implementation problem
for inflation targeting. Inflation targeting is more a hierarchical mandate than a dual mandate. A
truncated rule (without the output gap) appeared as a theoretical answer (Batini and Haldane, 1999),
but this solution does not characterize well the practice of central banking. The development of the
DGSE models and of the New Macroeconomic Consensus (NCM) around three equations (IS, TR
and NKPC) explains the numerous papers on the status of the output gap.
In our model, we use two of three equations from the NCM: a Taylor rule and a New Keynesian
Phillips Curve. But we replace the IS equation by our post keynesian SFC model. We take two sorts
of Taylor rule: a standard one and a truncated one.
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The first hypothesis (M1) is that central bank uses a standard Taylor rule, modelling the dual
mandate of the Fed. The key interest rate (icb) is a negative function of the output gap and a positive
function of the inflation gap. Output gap is the difference between the full capacity output (Yfc) and
the current output (Y). Output gap in ratio (see equation 8.19 for OGR) is output over the output
gap. Inflation gap is the difference between current inflation and the target of inflation (Π*). As in
standard Taylor rule, we add a neutral interest rate, exogenously fixed at 2 %. The inflation target is
1 %. At the steady state, the key interest rate is equal to 3 %, so the real key interest rate is equal to
the neutral interest rate (icb – Π* = i* = 2%). In this case, the three gaps (output, inflation and
interest rate) are equal to zero. The monetary rule M1 is:
(8.59-M1) icb = i* + Π + α4 .OGR + α6 (Π - Π*)
The second hypothesis (M2) is a truncated Taylor rule similar to the unique mandate of ECB. A
truncated Taylor rule only contains the inflation gap. When the central bank has a unique mandate,
the fear of inflation is higher. We should have: α5 > α6. We put α6 = 0,5 and α5 > 1. The monetary
rule (M2) is:
(8.59-M2) icb = i* + α5 (Π - Π*)
(8.60-vi) REF ≡ REF-1 + ΔH + ΔB + ΔF – CG – Pb - ΔD
A kind of New Keynesian Phillips Curve models inflation (Taylor, 1979). When inflation is low
and close to its target, we consider that the anticipations of inflation are anchored on the target. In
this case, inflation does not react to the variations of output gap (OGR). Inflation depends only on
the anticipated inflation (Πa) that is anchored on the target: Πa = Π*. This leads to a horizontal
NKPC. But if the variations in output are too important (for instance, close to full capacity output)
or, if an exogenous supply shock occurs (for instance, a shock in the productivity or in the oil
price), inflation reacts. Inflation reappears over OGRmini and disinflation under OGRmaxi. The idea
that for small disturbances the inflation rate is stable while for large disturbances it is unstable was
coined by Leijonhufvud (1981:112n) in the notion of a ‘corridor’. The economy has stability inside
the corridor, while it will lose stability outside. Such a ‘corridor of stability’ can provide another
way of looking at Keynes's insight that the economy is not violently unstable.The shape of the curve
is as follows:
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Inflation Π
Π*
OGR : ratio of output gap
OGRmini OGRmaxi
Figure 8.2  NKPC with a ‘cost push’ = 0
We can write the equation of inflation as a sort of NKPC:
(8.61) Π  =  Π* + d1 .( OGRmini + OGR) + d2 .( OGRmaxi + OGR) + Cost push
We can model the loss function of the society as a linear-quadratic function. It supposes that the
society has a symmetric target. It is an ad hoc loss function because it does not have any micro-
foundations. It is not a utility-based loss function based on the utility function of the representative
agent (Woodford, 2003). It is connected with the final objective of the society. The society seeks to
reach three objectives: price stability, full employment and financial-market stability. The price of
equities is not part of governments’ or central banks’ policies. Society as a whole does not share the
same concerns that the government or the central bank. Their reaction functions are not derived
from the loss function. Asset prices in the steady state correspond to (pe*). We measure the
volatility of the asset prices by (pe – pe*). We can represent the welfare performance of such
policies by their welfare cost. In our model, we have: β1 = β2 = β3 = 1,33
(8.62) LF = β1 (Π - Π*)
2 + β2 OGR
2 + β3 (pe – pe*)
2
Our model is now closed. We have defined the 26 variables of the transactions matrix
introducing 37 new variables7 and we now have the same number of equations (62) and unknowns.
Furthermore, we have managed to use the M + N – 1 = 8 accounting identities issued from the
transcription of the transactions matrix. The missing identity concerns the capital account of the
central bank:
(8.63viii)  REF = H
This identity reflects the fact that high-powered money is supplied through advances to private
banks. Of course, this accounting identity must invariably hold. When we solve numerically our
model, identity (viii) H ≡ REF perfectly holds.
                                                
7 These 37 new variables are the following:
Government: DG
Firms: gry, grKD Y, Yfc, K, ID, rcf, u, ICF, ϕ, ϕ
d, IF, amort, OGR
Private Banks: CG, CGof, CGof
a CGe, CGe
a, RP, lev, q, OF, E, rof
a, re
a, Pda, rp
Households: Yw
a, Yv
a, Yw, Yv, Yh
Central Bank : icb, Π, LF
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EXPERIMENTS ABOUT A SUPPLY SHOCK WITH TWO POLICY MIX
We make simulations8 by imposing exogenous supply shocks corresponding to an inflationary
shock of 1% during three years (5, 6 and 7); e.g. an increase in oil price. This cost-push increase in
inflation is first reflected in the NKPC and then, the key interest rate given by the Taylor rule. The
key interest rate of the central bank is endogenous. In turn, changes in the short term rate of interest
modify the long term interest rate and the growth rate through the different channels of transmission
developed by the model. Then fiscal policy acts upon the economy.
The consequences of the supply shock are examined for two kinds of policy mix9:
• For country (1), monetary policy is determined by a standard Taylor rule (M1) that
corresponds to a dual mandate: output gap and inflation gap. The fiscal policy rule (F1)
has a stabilizing effect (see Figure 8.1). But this effect is insufficient to restore the
economy to the previous steady state. There is a co-ordination between the monetary and
the fiscal policies. Country (1) could describe as a policy followed by the United States.
• For country (2), monetary policy is determined by a ‘truncated’ Taylor rule (M2) that
corresponds to a unique mandate: inflation gap only. Fiscal policy (F2) is neutralized,
because we assume the fiscal rule that the ratio of the current deficit of the Government
(GD) on the GDP is constant and equal to zero, as imposed by the Maastricht treaty.
Country (2) could describe an idealized European policy.
In our economy, the steady state is not the full-employment equilibrium. The output gap is
positive, with a significant rate of unemployment. Potential output corresponds to the full capacity
output. Figure 8.3 shows that country (1) resists much better than country (2) to a supply shock. The
fall in the growth rate and in the desired growth rate of accumulation of capital is much lower. In
addition, the emergence of economic cycles is obvious in the country (2). Without output gap in the
Taylor rule and with the removal of the fiscal tool, the economic situation deteriorates and becomes
more strongly cyclical.
                                                
8 We use the E-views 5.5 software.
9 For a more precise analysis of the institutional design (European Union, United States, Japan), see Creel and Capoen
(2007) and Le Heron (2007b).
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Figure 8.3 Inflationary shock of 1 % during 3 years (M1-F1, M2-F2): effects on
the growth rate of the economy and on the desired rate of accumulation
The rate of utilization of productive capacity falls more in the second country than in the first
(Figure 8.4). The financial behaviour of firms explains widely these developments. The borrower’s
risk measured by the rate of cash flow (rcf) and the financial condition index (FCI) rises
substantially. With higher costs of financing, the rate of cash flows (rcf = P
u /K-1) drops in the short
term. Interest payments on loans and commercial papers increase, and this reduces retained profits.
But then, firms reduce the issue of equities to preserve the part of undistributed profits (Pu) and the
rate of cash flow rises but under its first position. The drop in the Tobin’s ratio is an additional
negative effect (Figure 8.5). The financial condition index increases vigorously with the fall in the
financial capitalization (E/Y). With the depressed FCI and the lower cash flow ratio, the borrower’s
risk increases seriously.
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Capacity utilization rate (M1-F1) Capacity utilization rate (M2-F2)
Figure 8.4  Inflationary shock of 1 % during 3 years (M1-F1, M2-F2): effects on
 the rate of utilization capacity
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To simplify, we introduced inflation only in the NKPC and we do not take into account the
difference between real and monetary variables in the rest of the model. Inflation could be
integrated into the determinants of lender’s risk and borrower’s risk and into the portfolio matrix, in
order to better integrate the wealth effects. Monetary policy tries to neutralize expectations of
inflation, but it had little impact on the shock of inflation, which is exogenous.
Since the fear of inflation is higher in country (2), central bank rate of interest reacts more
vigorously (Figure 8.6). This rise enlarges the output gap more in country (2) than in country (1).
Business cycles appear (Figure 8.7). With a lower inflation rate and a higher interest rate, the real
interest rate of country (2) far exceeds that of country (1), which restricts more investment and
growth.
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Key rate of interest (M1-F1) Rate of inflation (M1-F1) Key rate of interest (M2-F2) Rate of inflation (M2-F2)
Figure 8.6 Inflationary shock of 1 % during 3 years (M1-F1, M2-F2):
effects on the rate of interest and on the rate of inflation
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Figure 8.7 Inflationary shock of 1 % during 3 years (M1-F1, M2-F2):
effects on the output gap
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The influence of output gap on the key interest rate is lower than that of inflation, even with the
standard Taylor rule. With the sharp rise in interest rates, investment, which reacts swiftly to the
interest rate, will be more affected than other components of demand. On the one hand, the fall in
investment will be larger than the expansion resulting from stabilizing policy of the country (1). On
the other hand, the fiscal policy F2, which has no stabilizing effect, explains the strong negative
effect on the growth of the country (2). Finally, the rise in interest rates improves the financial
income of households and so consumption. But, with our Kaleckian consumption function, the
benefits on consumption are very weak. This effect is insufficient to offset the others.
One key element of the experiments is the increase of the lender’s risk. The fall of the Tobin’s q
ratio plus the lowest solvency of firms following the rise of the interest rates explain the rise of the
lender’s risk and the decreasing leverage ratio (Figure 8.5). Our virtual economies experience a
transitory business depression, characterized by a lower rate of utilization capacity, a lower Tobin’s
ratio and leverage, and higher lender’s and borrower’s risks. The consequence is a credit rationing
of the investment of firms by private banks (Figure 8.8). The credit rationing of firms explains an
increasing rate of unemployment. The situation is worse in the second country.
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(a) Figure 8.5 Inflationary shock of 1 % during 3 years: (a) M1-F1, (b) M2-F2: (b)
effects on Lender’s risk, on banks profit (6%), and on Tobin’s q ratio
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Figure 8.8 Inflationary shock of 1 % during 3 years (M1-F1, M2-F2):
effects on credit rationing
Let us examine the bank-balance-sheet channel. Four channels ar5 usually taken into account by
literature: wealth effect (Davis et Palumbo, 2001), Tobin’s q (Tobin, 1969), the financial accelerator
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(Bernanke and al., 1999) and the capital of banks (Van den Heuvel, 2002).  We have these four
channels in the model (Le Heron, 2007a).
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Figure 8.9 Inflationary shock of 1 % during 3 years (M1-F1, M2-F2):
effects on finance structure (E = 50 %; OF = 23 %; L = 19 %; CP =: 8 %)
With the country 2, we see a sharp volatility in the financial markets (stocks and bonds) and a
significant fall in the profit of banks (Figures 8.5 and 8.9). These elements could explain the coming
out of financial crises.
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Figure 8.10 Welfare performance of the society:
loss function with three equal objectives: Inflation, Output gap and Stability of asset prices
We can argue from these experiments that it is preferable to include the output gap in Taylor
rule and that the use of stabilizing fiscal policy is beneficial. Indeed, simulations showed a high
volatility in production with the truncated rule, but also price volatility on the financial markets.
Financial instability may be an unforeseen consequence. Since money is not neutral, it is difficult to
consider inflation only for the monetary policy. We note that the absence of output gap accentuates
the decline in the growth and increases the volatility of the economy. In case of supply shock, co-
ordination with a stabilizing fiscal policy always generates better results and does not cause any
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business cycles. Co-ordination between policies, as we see in United States, is more efficient than
the total separation between fiscal and monetary policies, which is required by the Maastricht treaty.
We have modelled two kinds of institutions. We can use a welfare function of the society
seeking to maximize the following three objectives with the same weight for each of them: price
stability, growth and stability in financial markets. Clearly, the institutional design of the United
States is far better than in European Union (Figure 8.10).
In this chapter, we have tried to make the New Keynesian consensus in macroeconomics
compatible with the Post Keynesian theories in a stock-flow consistent approach. By taking into
account the behaviour of private banks, a more realistic creation of money, the stocks and the
financial risks of firms and banks, we can analyze more deeply the problems of co-ordination
between fiscal policy and monetary policy. Indeed, the intensity of these problems has increased
with the full independence given to some central banks. This stock-flow consistent model is a first
step into this research agenda.
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Appendix 1.  Glossary of variables
Y National income
Yfc Output of full capacity
gry Growth rate in the national income
Π Inflation
Π* Inflation target
N Employment
Nfe Full employment
OG Output gap
OGR Ratio of output gap
Un Unemployment
run Rate of unemployment
L Loans (variable long-term rate)
CP Commercial paper
B Treasury bills
E Equities
e Number of equities
pe Price of equities
OF Bonds (Fixed rate)
of Number of bonds
pof Price of fixed rate bonds
LF Loss function of the society
Central Bank
Pcb Central bank profits
REF Reserve requirements (CB refunds)
H High-powered money
icb Central bank key interest rate
i* Neutral interest rate
Commercial Banks
Pb Banks profits
Vb Net wealth of banks
CG Capital gains of banks (Capital losses
of firms)
CGe Capital gains on equities
CGe
a Expected capital gains on equities
CGof Capital gains on bonds
CGof
a Expected capital gains on bonds
icp Interest rate on commercial  paper
id Interest rate on deposits
il Interest rate on loans
ib Interest rate on treasury bills
FCI Financial Condition Index
LR Lender’s risk
lr Lender’s risk for long-term interest
rate
rof
a Expected yield of bonds
re
a Expected return on equities
Pd Expected distributed profits
lev Leverage ratio
q Tobin’s q ratio
Firms
I Net investment
ID Investment demand
W Wages
K Stock of capital
Vf Net wealth of firms
u Capacity utilization rate
grk Growth rate in the stock of capital
grkD Desired growth rate in the stock of
capital
ΔF Net finance
ϕ Gross finance
ϕd Desired gross investment
IF Internal Funds
amort Amortization (debt redemption)
P Firms profits
Pd Distributed profits
Pu  Undistributed profits
rcf Borrower’s risk (ratio of cash flow)
Government
G Government expenditure
DG Government deficit
gdg Constant ratio of government deficit
Pcb Central bank profits
T Taxes
Households
C Consumption
D Bank deposits
Yw
a Expected disposable income of
workers
Yv
a Expected disposable financial income
Yw Disposable income of workers
Yv Disposable financial income
Yh Disposable income of household
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